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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a model of interbank trading with memory. The
memory mechanism is used to introduce a proxy of trust in the model. The
key idea is that a lender, having lent many times to a borrower in the past,
is more likely to lend to that borrower again in the future than to other
borrowers, with which the lender has never (or has infrequently) interacted.
The core of the model depends on only two parameters, which are common
to all lenders: one is w and it is representing the attractiveness of borrowers,
the other is Q and it represents the memory of lenders in their assessment
of counter parties. The stronger the w parameter, the more random the
matching results between lenders and borrowers. The stronger the Q pa-
rameter, the more stable trading relationships become. Model outcomes and
real money market data are compared through a variety of measures that
describe the structure and properties of trading networks. These include
number of statistically validated links, bidirectional links, and 3-motifs. The
model reproduces well features of preferential trading patterns empirically
observed in a real market.
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1. Introduction
Well functioning interbank markets effectively channel liquidity from in-
stitutions with surplus funds to those in need and thus play a key role in
banks liquidity management and the transmission of monetary policy. Be-
fore the 2007-2008 financial crisis, liquidity and credit risks were perceived as
negligible in these markets. Nonetheless the collapse of interbank lending has
been a central feature of the subprime financial crisis. Liquidity hoarding and
trust evaporation have been identified as two important determinants of the
interbank market drying up during the crisis (Heider et al. (2009); Acharya
and Merrouche (2013)). Haldane (2009) has advocated that the interbank
market freeze is a manifestation of the behaviour under stress of a com-
plex, adaptive network, the complexity arising from the interconnectedness
of players via mutual exposures to each other, and the adaptation from the
attempts of agents to optimise interdependent strategies in the presence of
(Knightian) uncertainty. Several authors have since called for the adoption
of network analysis to understand the mechanisms leading to the formation
of trading relationships.
Recently some theoretical studies have considered the problem of network
formation in a financial system (Babus (2007), Allen and Babus (2008))
and also, from the perspective of network formation games (Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), Dutta et al. (2005), Bloch and Jackson (2007), Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2007)). The presence of a network underlying the bilateral
credit interactions occurring, for example, in an interbank market has a role
in the setting of both linkages that insure against liquidity risk and linkages
that can channel contagion risk.
The empirical network literature has aimed at characterising the observed
topology of the interbank market checking for regularities and stylised facts
(Boss et al. (2004), Iori et al. (2008), Iazzetta and Manna (2009), Bech
and Atalay (2010), Craig and Von Peter (2010), Brauning and Fecht (2011),
Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014), Iyer and Peydro (2011)).
Simulation studies have attempted to quantify more directly the impact of
the network structure on the propagation of contagion addressing a number of
complementary issues including: the relationship between the network struc-
ture of the interbank market and its resilience to different kind of shocks (Gai
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et al. (2011), Iori et al. (2006), Battiston et al. (2012), Lenzu and Tedeschi
(2012), Georg (2013), Ladley (2013) ); the effects of assets fire-sale (Nier
et al. (2007)); roll-over risk and portfolio overlaps (Anand et al. (2013), Cac-
cioli et al. (2012)); impact of regulatory taxes (Thurner and Poledna (2013),
Poledna and Thurner (2014)) feedback loops between the macroeconomy and
the financial sector (Grilli et al. (2012)). An actor-oriented model of network
formation in the Interbank market is proposed in Finger and Lux (2014).
Broadly speaking, two complementary approaches have been adopted. In
the agent-based models case, the interbank exposure networks and default
events emerge endogenously from the behavioural rules followed by the eco-
nomic agents (Iori et al. (2006), Georg (2013), Ladley (2013)). In the stress
test experiments case, the exposure network is taken as exogenously given,
either calibrated to real market data or generated according to preset spec-
ifications (Upper (2011).Gai and Kapadia (2010), Caccioli et al. (2012)). In
this second approach, even when detailed information on banks bilateral ex-
posures is available, the analysis is typically restricted to few snapshots of
the banking system. For this reason a probabilistic approach has been advo-
cated consisting in generating an ensemble of random networks, of which the
empirical network can be considered a typical sample. This allows to analyze
not only the vulnerability of one particular network realization retrieved from
the real data, but of many alternative realistic networks, compatible with a
set of constrains (Lu and Zhou (2011), Halaj and Kok (2013)).
In the present study we introduce a model of preferential formation of
bilateral credit relationships in a centralized interbank market with hetero-
geneous market participants. The market heterogeneity, in number of credit
transactions, is assumed to be exogenously given. The existence of stable
credit relationships is associated with the detection of over-expression of bi-
lateral transactions with respect to a null hypothesis or random matching,
taking into account banks’ heterogeneity. Our model contributes to both
streams of the literature. In itself it is a simple agent based model, but in
assuming a predefined constrain, that can be calibrated from real data, it
can be used as a tool for generating scenarios for stress-test experiments.
While our model has a general validity we test its performance against the
e-MID market. The e-MID is the only electronic market for interbank de-
posits in the euro area and the USA. In a centralized interbank market, such
as the e-MID, banks publicly quote their offers to lend or borrow money at a
given maturity. The quotes can be anonymous but before finalizing the loan
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contract the lender has the right to know the identity of the borrower and can
refuse to finalize the transaction. While early studies on the e-MID market
(Iori et al. (2008)) have revealed a fairly random network at the daily scale,
a non-random structure has been uncovered for longer aggregation periods.
Monthly and quarterly aggregated data show that since the 1990s a high de-
gree of bank concentration occurred (Iazzetta and Manna (2009)), with fewer
banks acting as global hubs for the whole network. The hubs tend to cluster
together and a significant core-periphery structure has been observed (Fin-
ger et al. (2013)). Lasting interbank relationships, which remained stable
throughout the financial crisis, have been observed by Affinito (2011) and
Temizsoy et al. (2014)1. A networked structure of the e-MID market was
observed in Hatzopoulos et al. (2013) by using a methodology based on the
detection of statistically validated networks (Tumminello et al. (2011)) that
allows the researcher to control for bank heterogeneity. In the cited study the
networked nature of the e-MID market was highlighted by selecting repeated
credit interactions (specifically, overnight loan contracts) between pairs of
banks that were statistically incompatible with a null hypothesis of random
pairing of the loans, which took into account the transaction heterogeneity
of the banks. In other words, the underlying trading network of banks was
assumed to be primarily driven by the heterogeneity of the banks whereas
the networked nature of some bilateral relationships was associated with a
dynamical over-expression of the number of bilateral transactions.
Overall empirical studies of the e-MID data have identified important
properties of the market but have also shown that the e-MID interbank net-
work remained surprisingly stable during the subprime crisis (Fricke and
Lux (2012)) with a structural break only appearing after the Lehman de-
fault. These findings were confirmed, at the intraday scale, by Abraham
et al. (2013) who have uncovered regularities in the network growth process
that did not change during crisis. This indirectly suggests that the under-
1In these papers the strength of lending relationships is measured by the concentra-
tion of lending/borrowing activity between banks. More precisely, for every lender and
borrower a preference index is computed, equal to the ratio of total funds that a lender
(borrower) has lent to (borrowed from ) a borrower (lender) during a given period, over
the total amount of funds that the lender (borrower) has lent in (borrowed from) the
interbank market during the same period. This measure nonetheless does not take into
account the heterogeneity of the banking system and the fact that large banks may have
no alternative than to trade with each other if they need to exchange large volumes.
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lying mechanisms driving the link formation in this market are stable over
time, making it a good benchmark to test our model.
Our model outcomes and e-MID data are compared through a variety of
measures including the number of statistically validated links, bidirectional
links, and 3-motifs. Comparison with the data is performed by separately
considering the role of lender aggressors from the role of the borrower ag-
gressors, where the aggressor is the party proposing the setting of the loan
contract. In both cases the number of networked relationships observed in
simulations agrees well with the number observed in real data. The fraction
of bidirectional links is small (< 10%) in both networks obtained from real
data and simulations, indicating a low degree of reciprocity in the system.
Specifically, on average, model outcomes present a slightly smaller number of
bidirectional links than real data showing that the introduction of a tunable
level of reciprocity is required to take into account the degree of reciprocity
observed in real data.
In addition to the analysis of the mean number of networked relationships,
and of the fraction of bidirectional links we also analyze the local nature of the
relationships by studying the triads present in simulations and real data both
for the original and statistically validated networks. Triads, or 3-motifs, i.e.
isomorphic classes of subnetworks of 3 nodes, have been recently investigated
in empirical studies of the Interbank trading networks of the Netherlands
(Squartini et al. (2013)) and Italy (Bargigli et al. (2013)). We show that
real data presents over-expression and under-expression of some specific 3-
motifs in some of the investigated three-maintenance periods whereas the
over-expression or under-expression is almost absent for statistically validated
networks. Again our basic model is generating networks characterized by
preferential links but the preferential relationships is introduced only at the
level of a specific pair of bank.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our trading
model of an interbank market. In Section 3 we describe the e-MID interbank
dataset. In Section 4 we present the output of the model for different choices
of the control parameters and we compare the trading networks obtained
from simulations and from real data. Finally, in Section 5 we draw our
conclusions.
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2. A trading model with reinforcing memory
Our model relies on the assumption that if a bank Bj has lent many
times to a bank Bi (i, j = 1, · · · , n, where n is the number of banks) in a
past time window then it’s likely that it will keep doing so in the future, unless
external conditions change. Our model attempts to incorporate the intrinsic
heterogeneity of banks with respect to their trading activity as a lender or a
borrower in a given time period. Specifically, we introduce a characteristic
time window, TM , which will constitute the time step of our model and over
which external conditions do not change. In particular we assume that at
the beginning of each trading period TM , banks are exogenously allocating a
number of transactions to execute within that time period. While in reality
banks receive liquidity shocks continuously, it is not unreasonable to assume
that they can anticipate their liquidity needs over future periods. Settlement
of security transactions for example occurs on a transaction date plus one,
two or three days, so banks know in advance about large payments that have
to be executed. The BCBS Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management
and Supervision explicitly require banks to ”... be able to measure expected
daily gross liquidity inflows and outflows, anticipate the intraday timing of
these flows where possible, and forecast the range of potential net funding
shortfalls that might arise at different points during the day”. Under the
new Liquidity Coverage Ratio banks are required to be able to meet (and
hence anticipate) their liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress
scenario. We acknowledge that our simplifying assumption implies an aspect
on non-causality in our model especially when the number of transactions
occurring during a period of investigation is rather large. We will discuss
again about this limitation at the end of this section.
The choice of the marginal distributions from which the number of trans-
actions that each bank, Bi, is allocated as a lender (borrower) in lender -
aggressor transactions, Bl,lai (B
b,la
i ), and as a lender (borrower) in borrower -
aggressor transactions, Bl,bai (B
b,ba
i ), is in principle arbitrary (in our simula-
tions we calibrate it to e-MID data as explained in section 4).
Within TM each bank will execute all the transactions that have been as-
signed to it at the beginning of the time step. An event parameter t defines
the order at which transactions sequentially occur, i. e. the event t indicates
that t transactions already occurred in TM . As the model shall distinguish
between borrower-aggressor and lender-aggressor transactions, at each trans-
action t in TM , the outcome of a binary random variable, xlb, determines if
6
the next transaction is a lender-aggressor or a borrower-aggressor transac-
tion. The variable xlb takes value “lender-aggressor” with probability pl(t),
proportional to the number of lender-aggressor transactions that remain to
be executed in time window TM , (and value “borrower-aggressor” otherwise).
Once the decision about the type of transaction is made, the model indicates
how the counterparts of the transaction should be selected. We first focus
on a lender-aggressor transaction. To mimic a lender-aggressor transaction
we assume that an order to borrow is placed by a bank Bi that is randomly
selected with probability
pb(Bi, t) ∝ Bb,lai (t). (1)
Quantity Bb,lai (t) is the number of transactions that bank Bi has left to
do in time-window TM , as a borrower, in the lender-aggressor transactions,
after a total number of t transactions already occurred in TM . Once the
borrower is selected, we randomly select a bank Bj to be the counterpart of
the transaction, the lender, with probability
pl(Bj, t|Bi) ∝ Bl,laj (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]
, (2)
where Bl,laj (t) is the number of transactions that bank Bj has left to do in
time-window TM as a lender in the lender-aggressor transactions after t total
transactions. The quantity NBj→Bi(t) is the total number of transactions in
which Bj lent money to Bi over the past Q time-windows, in spite of the
type of transaction2. Finally, w is a parameter, here assumed equal for all
the banks, which represents a common level of attractiveness of borrowers.
This parameter dominates the dynamics at the beginning of a simulation,
when NBj→Bi(t) is equal to zero or it is very small. The parameter w acts
as a randomization factor. In fact a large value of w would prevent the
memory mechanism from working effectively, and the result will be a random
network without preferential links3. The two equations above imply that the
2The memory mechanism that we introduced in the model is based on the number of
transactions between banks in the past Q time windows . However, such a mechanism
could easily be adapted to take into account volumes: it is sufficient to replace, in all the
equations above, NBj→Bi(t) with the volume VBj→Bi(t) that bank Bj lent to bank Bi in
the past Q time windows.
3The parameter w could be made node specific, such as in fitness models, and/or time
varying, and used to model bank reputation. However, this possibility is out of the scope
of the present paper and will be explored elsewhere.
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probability that a (lender-aggressor) transaction occurs from A (the lender)
to B (the borrower) after t transactions is:
p(Bj → Bi, t) = pb(Bi, t) pl(Bj, t|Bi)
=
Bb,lai (t)∑n
k=1B
b,la
k (t)
· B
l,la
j (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]∑n
q=1B
l,la
q (t)
[
w +NBq→Bi(t)
] . (3)
The way in which we model borrower-aggressor transactions is slightly
different, because the lender has always the possibility to refuse to trade
with a specific borrower. The model works as follows. A lender, Bj, is
randomly selected with probability
pl(Bj, t) ∝ Bl,baj (t), (4)
that is, with probability proportional to the number of transactions Bl,baj ,
that Bj, has left to do as lender in borrower-aggressor transactions after t
transactions of time window TM occurred. Then a borrower, Bi, is selected
with probability
pb(Bi, t) ∝ Bb,bai (t), (5)
proportional to the number of transactions Bb,bai (t), that Bi, has left to do
as a borrower in borrower-aggressor transactions after t transactions of time
window TM . So far, the selection of lender and borrower occurred indepen-
dently. However, once the borrower is selected, the lender, Bj has a certain
probability to accept borrower Bi as counterpart in the transaction. This
probability is set to be proportional to the attractiveness w plus the degree
of trust that lender Bj associates with bank Bi. Therefore the probability
that Bj lends to Bi at event t of time window TM , conditioned to the fact
that Bj has been selected as the lender is:
pb(Bi, t|Bj) ∝ Bb,bai (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]
. (6)
If the two banks do not end up trading then another borrower should be
randomly selected, and so on, until the lender Bj finds an acceptable coun-
terpart. In our simulations, we work in the space of transactions4, and, from
4In fact time is just an event time increasing as an integer variable describing successive
transactions
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the perspective of transactions, the process of searching a suitable counter-
part of lender Bj is equivalent to randomly selecting a borrower Bi with
probability
pb(Bi, t|Bj) =
Bb,bai (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]∑n
m=1B
b,ba
m (t)
[
w +NBj→Bm(t)
] . (7)
Therefore, in the case of borrower-aggressor transaction, we obtain that the
probability that a transaction occurs between a lender Bj and a borrower Bi
is given by:
p(Bj → Bi, t) = pl(Bj, t) pb(Bi, t|Bj)
=
Bl,baj (t)∑n
q=1B
l,ba
q (t)
· B
b,ba
i (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]∑n
m=1B
b,ba
m (t)
[
w +NBj→Bm(t)
] . (8)
The objective of our model is mainly to show how an intuitive mechanism,
such as a memory mechanism, which determines the probability that two
banks trade at a given time, may give rise to preferential patterns of trading
that have been observed in real data (see Hatzopoulos et al 2013). The
simplicity of the model has a cost in terms of an absence of causality especially
when the number of transactions occurring during a period of investigation
and network analysis is rather large. In Appendix A we discuss how to
generalize the model to solve the problem of the causality for any number of
transactions occurring in a period of investigation and network analysis.
3. Data
Interbank markets can be organized in different ways: physically on the
floor, by bilateral interactions, or on electronic platforms. In Europe, inter-
bank trades are executed in all these ways. The only electronic market for
Interbank Deposits in the euro area and USA is called e-MID. It was founded
in Italy in 1990 for Italian Lira transactions and became denominated in Eu-
ros in 1999. When the financial crisis started, the market players were 246,
belonging to 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Den-
mark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Portugal. According to the European
Central Bank e-MID accounted, before the crisis, for 17% of total turnover
in unsecured money markets in the Euro Area. A recent report on money
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markets (European Central Bank, 2011), recorded around 10% of the total
overnight turnovers. Trading in e-MID starts at 8 a.m. and ends at 6 p.m.
Contracts of different maturities, from one day to a year can be traded but
the overnight segment (defined as the trade for a transfer of funds to be ef-
fected on the day of the trade and to return on the subsequent business day
at 9 : 00 a.m.) represents more than 90% of the transactions. One distinctive
feature of the platform is that it is fully transparent. Trades are public in
terms of maturity, rate, volume, and time. Buy and sell proposals appear
on the platform with the identity of the bank posting them (the quoter may
choose to post a trade anonymously but this option is rarely used). Market
participants can choose their counterparts. An operator willing to trade can
pick a quote and manifest his wish to close the trade while the quoter has
the option to reject an aggression. The database is composed by the records
of all transactions registered in the period from 25-Jan-1999 to 7-Dec-2009.
Each line contains a code labeling the quoting bank, i.e. the bank that pro-
poses a transaction, and the aggressor bank, i.e. the bank that accepts a
proposed transaction. The rate the lending bank will receive is expressed per
year; the volume of the transaction is expressed in millions of Euros. The
banks are reported together with a code representing their country and, for
Italian banks, a label that encodes their size, as measured in terms of total
assets. A label indicates the side of the aggressor bank, i.e. whether the
latter is lending/selling (“Sell”) or borrowing/buying (“Buy”) capitals to or
from the quoting bank. Other labels indicate the dates and the exact time
of the transaction and the maturity of the contract. We consider the dataset
obtained by considering only the overnight (“ON”) and the overnight long
(“ONL”) contracts. The latter is the version of the ON when more than one
night/day is present between two consecutive business day. This is the same
dataset already investigated by Hatzopoulos et al. (2013). In the present
study, as in Hatzopoulos et al. (2013), we limit our investigation to transac-
tions occurring only between Italian banks.
The period of time in which credit institutions have to comply with the
minimum reserve requirements is called the reserve maintenance period. Dur-
ing each reserve maintenance period minimum reserve levels are calculated
on the basis of banks’ own balance sheet. Each reserve maintenance period
is usually equivalent to one calendar month, i.e. about 23 trading days. In
the investigations we present below, we have aggregated the maintenance
periods in groups of three. In fact, these aggregated periods better capture
the natural economic cycles that are usually organized on a nearly 3-monthly
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basis. We therefore will consider 44 three-maintenance periods ranging from
25-Jan-1999 to 07-Dec-20095.
4. Numerical Simulations
This section is divided into two subsections. In the first subsection we
run the model6 under different choices for the value of the two parameters
w and Q, and study their effect on the resulting interaction networks. For
these simulation exercises, that we call Mode I, we sample the number of
transactions each banks executes, in a time period TM , from predetermined
marginal distribution functions.
In the second subsection we compare the simulated and empirical net-
works and assess the ability of our model to generate realistic scenarios,
given a set of constraints, that could, for example, be used for stress test
exercises. For these simulation exercises, that we call Mode II, the number
of transactions each bank executes in a time period TM is taken as an input
from the e-MID market data.
4.1. Simulations of the model: Mode I
While the model is defined for arbitrary distributions for the number of
transactions that each bank is allocated, as a lender and borrower, in lender -
aggressor transactions, Bl,lai and B
b,la
i , and in borrower -aggressor transac-
tions, Bl,bai and B
b,ba
i , we take here the functional choice that is more consis-
tent with e-MID data. Empirical evidence for the e-MID market shows that,
when aggregating over different time scales, banks can act both as a lender
and a borrower and that the trading activity can vary considerably across
banks. To best account for this heterogeneity in our model we rely upon
the results obtained in Fricke and Lux (2013), and assume that Bl,lai , B
b,la
i ,
Bl,bai and B
b,ba
i follow Log-normal distributions, with parameters specific to
5It should be noted that the first three-maintenance period covers the time period from
25-Jan-1999 to 23-Mar-1999, thus involving a number of trading days which is reduced of
a factor of about one third with respect to all the other three-maintenance periods.
6Results presented in this section were obtained through an implementation of the
model written by using Mathematica. The model has also been developed using Java
and the MASON library for multi-agent modeling, and is being currently tested. The
implementation within the Java/Mason framework will allow to include and integrate
our model into the interbank sector of the CRISIS macro-financial software library. A
description of the implementation in Java/Mason is provided in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Distributions of the parameters of the Log-normal distributions, Bl,la and Bb,la,
for the Lender-Aggressor database (left) and Bl,ba and Bb,ba for the Borrower-Aggressor
(right) database (µ and σ are the log-scale and the shape parameter of the lognormal
distribution respectively).
each bank, and to the bank’s role (quoter/aggressor, lender/borrower). The
parameters were chosen in order to match, for each bank, the mean and
variance of the logarithm of the number of transaction of the e-MID data
over the 44 three maintenance periods. The distributions of the parameters
of the 4 lognormal marginal distributions, across the 254 banks7 included in
the simulation, are plotted in figure 1. We note that all the distributions for
the µ parameter are fat tailed and they reveal a high degree of heterogeneity
in the system.
It is worth pointing out that our model is not short-term stationary al-
though we have verified that it is long-term stationary. In fact, the link-
formation probability depends on the number of transactions between each
pair of banks over a given past time-window. This fact, together with the
presence of an arbitrary time zero, gives rise to a transient in each simula-
tion. However, according to all the quantities that we measured, such as,
for instance, the number of links in the original and statistically validated
networks, the transient is rather short, being of the order of one time window
or less.
In the simulations we report below we considered three possible values for
the reputation parameter w: w = 0.1, w = 1.0 and w = 10. For each of these
parameters we considered four possible values for the memory Q parameter:
7There are 254 active Italian banks on the e-MID market
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Q = 1, Q = 2, Q = 4 and Q = 8. Simulation runs span over TM = 100 time
periods.
In Fig. 2 we show the number of links in the original (top panel) and
Bonferroni (bottom panel) networks for Q = 1, 2, 4, 8 and w = 0.1, 1.0, 10.
The Bonferroni networks have been obtained from the original networks by
retaining only those links whose existence is not consistent with a random
null hypothesis taking into account the heterogeneity of nodes’ degree (see
Appendix C for more details on the statistical validation method).
The main result of this section is to show that our model is capable to gen-
erate a networked market whenever the parameter w is small enough. Indeed
Figure 2 shows that small values of the parameter w imply large numbers of
validated links. This is in agreement with the interpretation of w as a ran-
domization parameter that, when large, can impair the effectiveness of the
memory mechanism. Small values of w allow the memory mechanism to de-
termine and enhance even small deviations from random matching, and such
deviations are easily detected by the statistical validation method. On the
contrary, larger values of w may easily destroy small deviations from random
matching, which result in a smaller number of validated links. The figure
also shows that the number of the networked over-expressed connections is
weakly dependent on the memory parameter Q.
The parameter Q nonetheless impacts the degree of persistence of the
simulated networks. In fact, the probability that two banks trade depends on
the their trading history in the previous Q time windows of the simulation.
This memory mechanism introduces a certain degree of similarity in the
network of transactions obtained at different time intervals TM . It is possible
to quantify this similarity through the weighted Jaccard index between any
two of these networks, net1 and net2, obtained at different time intervals:
JW (net1, net2) =
∑
i,jMin[w
1
i,j, w
2
i,j]∑
i,jMax[w
1
i,j, w
2
i,j]
, (9)
where w1i,j is the weight of link i → j in the first network, net1, and w2i,j is
the weight of link i → j in the second network, net2. For an unweighted
network JW (net1, net2) reduces to usual Jaccard index:
JU(net1, net2) =
|E1 ∩ E2|
|E1 ∪ E2| , (10)
that is the number of directed links that belong to both network over the
number of links in the union network.
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Figure 2: Number of Links in the Lender aggressor transaction networks for the original
simulated networks (top) and Bonferroni networks (bottom). Q = 1, 2, 4, 8 and w =
0.1, 1.0, 10. The values of w are slightly shifted in the figure to improve readability for
different values of Q.
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Figure 3 shows the contour plots of the weighted Jaccard index for every
pair of networks for the lender-aggressor transactions resulting from a 100
time-step simulation (results are similar for the borrower-aggressor transac-
tions). The left panels show results for simulated networks with Q = 1 (first
row), Q = 2 (second row), Q = 4 (third row) and Q = 8 (fourth row). The
value of the parameter w has been fixed to 1 through all the simulations
under discussion8. The right panels show the weighted Jaccard index for the
corresponding statistically validated networks.
Looking at the left panels of Fig. 3 it is clear that, as we increase the
memory parameter, the area where the Jaccard index is higher (the green
area) becomes wider and wider: moving from Q = 1 to Q = 8, while keeping
w fixed, it becomes less likely for a new credit relationship to appear and
therefore the network structure persists over a longer time-span. This pattern
is even clearer when we look at the validated networks on the right panels.
Here we notice that the similarity among consecutive time periods is slightly
higher than the one in the corresponding original network. For longer lags,
however, the similarity in the validated networks decreases faster, as the
wider red areas in the contour plots show. At first sight this may look as a
contradiction, as one could expect that validated networks, preserving only
the most (statistically) relevant and stable links, should show a stronger
similarity, especially across time. Actually, the analysis in Hatzopoulos et al.
(2013) revealed that the same trend can be found in the E-Mid empirical
networks. Furthermore Hatzopoulos et al. (2013)) shows that a rewiring
procedure (equivalent to running our model purely with random matching
and no memory mechanism) does not destroy the pattern of persistence in the
original networks demonstrating that high values for the weighted Jaccard
index in the original networks are to a great extent consequence of the strong
constrains on which links can form imposed by heterogeneity in the banks’
activity.
8We have repeated the analysis for all values of w = 0.1, 1.0, 10 but the results do not
change. Here we report only on the case w = 1 to limit the length of the paper.
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Figure 3: Weighted Jaccard index matrices for the lender-aggressor simulated networks
(left panels) and the corresponding validated networks (right panels). The networks are
obtained from simulation with values for the memory parameter, from top to bottom,
Q = 1, Q = 2, Q = 4 and Q = 8. The randomization parameter w is equal to 1 in all the
simulations showed.
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4.2. Simulations of the model: Mode II
In this subsection we run simulations using the transactions realised by
each bank in the e-MID market as an input of the model. More precisely the
quantities Bl,lai , B
b,la
i , B
l,ba
i , and B
b,ba
i (i = 1, · · · , n), which are used in the
model to set the trading frequency of bank A as a lender and as a borrower,
in the two types of transactions—borrower-aggressor and lender-aggressor—
are those observed in real data. Moreover, we set the time interval TM over
which the number of transactions is planned equal to one three-maintenance
period. With this choice, we have 44 three-maintenance periods over which
the simulation runs.
This way the model can be used as a tool to generate stress test scenarios
where the total number of transactions executed by each bank is preserved.
The approach typically used by regulators in stress-test exercises is to take
a snapshot of the banking system, at a given date, and test its stability
under different stress assumptions. Rather than run stress test exercises
only on the realized exposure network, it would be desirable to generate a
statistical ensemble of scenarios, that preserve some features of the data,
over which stress test exercises can be executed. We choose here to preserve
the number of transactions executed by each banks. The underlying idea is
that while the number of transactions a bank needs to execute is determined
exogenously by its liquidity needs, the exact counter-party with which a
bank end up trading could be the outcome of a random match rather than a
deliberate choice. Rather than simply randomize the links via a configuration
model that preserves the strength of each node (strength measured in units of
number of transactions) our model allows to also preserve stable relationships
among banks by tuning the memory parameter.
As we have shown in the previous subsection, the number of links in the
transaction network is very sensitive to the w parameter but only weakly
dependent on the Q parameter. This permits to choose the values of the
two parameters separately. We first tune the w parameter by comparing the
number of links in the simulated and real networks. Once the value of w
has been selected, as the one that better reproduces the empirical data, we
fix it and choose the parameter Q that minimizes the Frobenius distance be-
tween the weighted Jaccard index matrices in simulated and real transaction
networks.
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4.3. Tuning of randomization parameter w
The various panels in Fig. 4 show the number of links in the trading
networks obtained by running our model, for different values of the parame-
ters w and Q, and the number of links in the original networks of overnight
transactions among Italian banks (the horizontal red lines, with correspond-
ing confidence interval). The comparison in Fig. 4 is done separately, for
the lender-aggressor data, for each year by averaging over 4 consecutive 3-
maintenance periods, for a total of 11 years.
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Figure 4: Log-log plot of the number of links in lender-aggressor simulated networks, for
different values of w and Q, and real network (solid red line). The comparison is done
separately for each year by averaging over 4 consecutive 3-maintenance periods. The last
plot (bottom, right) shows the overall result when averaging over the periods 11 till 30.
Dotted red lines indicate the intervals at plus or minus one standard deviation.
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We obtain a good agreement, in each year, between simulations and real
data for values of w between 0.1 and 1, with w closer to 1 at the beginning of
the analysed period of time and closer to 0.1 during the financial crisis. This
variation is a consequence of changes in both the composition of the e-MID
market in terms of participating banks and their strategies over the 11 years
periods. To achieve a proper calibration of the model we should thus allow
w to be time dependent and capture the existence of different “states” of
the market, such as with respect to market liquidity. However this is beyond
the scope of the current paper. Rather here we identify a time interval over
which the number of links in the e-MID adjacency matrices remained ap-
proximately constant (see Hatzopoulos et al. (2013) for more details on the
evolution of the e-MID market over time), that is the time between periods
11 and 30, and use this subsample of the data to determine the parameter
w. As shown in the last panel (bottom, right) of Figure 4 a value of w = 1
generates a number of links that is consistent, within the error bars, with
the real data. This is also the case for the borrower-aggressor dataset. We
thus choose w = 1 and we keep it constant throughout the 44 time windows
of the simulations.
4.3.1. Tuning of memory parameter Q
The tuning of the Q parameter is done by comparing the matrix of
weighted Jaccard index between for each pair of networks obtained from real
data, over the 44 three-maintenance periods, and the corresponding matrix
obtained from simulations of the model. The choice of Q we make, among the
values analysed, is the one that minimises the Frobenius distance between
the two matrices. The Frobenius distance between two matrices A and B,
with the same dimension n, is defined as:
F (A,B) =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(aij − bij)2 (11)
As reported in Table 1 the best fit for the original network is obtained
for Q = 2, both for lender aggressor and borrower aggressor transactions.
The two datasets of borrower-aggressor and lender-aggressor transactions
are analyzed independently one of the other. The results obtained from our
simulations indicate that the tradeoff between memory and randomness is in-
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dependent of the type of transactions, lender-aggressor or borrower-aggressor,
in which banks are involved.
Table 1: Frobenius distance between the matrices of weighted lagged Jaccard indices
between networks of real data and simulations (with w = 1) of lender aggressor and
borrower aggressor transactions.
Lender aggressor Borrower aggressor
Memory Original Bonferroni Original Bonferroni
Q=1 0.91 1.61 0.66 1.57
Q=2 0.45 1.75 0.36 1.41
Q=4 0.73 1.91 0.52 1.49
In Fig.5, we report the matrix of the weighted Jaccard index obtained
from the data (left panels), and the corresponding matrix obtained from
simulations of the model with w = 1 and Q = 2 (right panels) across the
corresponding 44 time windows . Top (bottom) panels correspond to lender-
aggressor (borrower-aggressor) transactions. The figure confirms that the
pattern of the weighted Jaccard index across the 44 three-maintenance peri-
ods analyzed for real data is similar to the one observed for simulations.
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Figure 5: Matrix of weighted Jaccard index between all pairs of transaction networks of
three-maintenance periods. The left panel shows the weighted Jaccard index between origi-
nal networks. The right panel shows the weighted Jaccard index between the corresponding
simulated networks for w = 1 and Q = 2. Lender-aggressor (top) and borrower-aggressor
(bottom).
4.3.2. Comparison of validated network
After tuning the parameters of the model with respect to the number
of links of the original networks, in this subsection we check if, with this
choice of parameters, the model is also able to reproduce realistic validated
networks.
In Figures 6 and 7, the number of links in the original and Bonferroni
networks, obtained by running and analyzing simulations of our model for
w = 1 and Q = 2, are compared with the number of links in the original
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Figure 6: Number of links in the original (top) and Bonferroni (central) network associated
with lender-aggressor transactions simulated according to the presented model, for w = 1
ad Q = 2. The red circles refer to the empirical data. The bottom panel shows the ratio
between number of links in the Bonferroni and original network.
and Bonferroni empirical networks for each of the 44 periods of trading in
the e-MID market. We observe that the agreement between the model and
the data is even better at the level of Bonferroni networks, a part from
the last 6 three-maintenance periods that correspond to the post-Lehman
default. This suggests that after the Lehman shock trust evaporated form
the market and banks strengthened their preferential relationships, a feature
the simulation analysis cannot reproduce as we have assumed a constant
value for w. By comparing the bottom panel of Figures 6 and 7, one notices
that the deviation from real data and the values expected from simulations
starts to be observed sooner for borrower aggressor networks than for lender
aggressor networks. This observation suggests that the preferential trading
links of borrower aggressors were under stress earlier that the preferential
trading links set by lender aggressors.
In Figure 8, we plot the weighted Jaccard index matrix for validated
networks associated with real data (left panels) and validated networks as-
sociated with simulations of our model for w = 1 and Q = 2 (right panels).
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Figure 7: Number of links in the original (top) and Bonferroni (central) network associated
with borrower-aggressor transactions simulated according to the presented model, for w =
1 ad Q = 2. The red circles refer to the empirical data. The bottom panel shows the ratio
between number of links in the Bonferroni and original network.
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The model and the data present a similar pattern of persistency. In fact
Table 1 reveals that Q = 2 is the value, among those analysed, for which
the Frobenious distance between real and simulated weighted Jaccard ma-
trices is smaller, in the case of the borrower-aggressor transactions. While a
value of Q = 4 corresponds to the smallest Frobenious distance in the case
of lender-aggressor transaction, a value Q = 2 is only marginally worse.
Three-Maintenance Period
Th
re
e-
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 P
er
io
d
2000 2004 2008
20
00
20
04
20
08
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Three-Maintenance Period
Th
re
e-
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 P
er
io
d
2000 2004 2008
20
00
20
04
20
08
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Three-Maintenance Period
Th
re
e-
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 P
er
io
d
2000 2004 2008
20
00
20
04
20
08
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Three-Maintenance Period
Th
re
e-
M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 P
er
io
d
2000 2004 2008
20
00
20
04
20
08
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Figure 8: Matrix of weighted Jaccard indices between validated networks associated with
real data (left panels) and between validated networks associated with simulations of
our model for w = 1 and Q = 2 (right panels). Lender-aggressor (borrower-aggressor)
transactions are considered in the top panels (bottom panels).
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4.3.3. Network prediction and model performance
In this section we ask how good or bad the model is to produce realiza-
tions that are pointwise (i.e. link by link) and not only structurally similar
to the real data. To do that we set our model parameters to the values
that, according to our previous analysis, provide the original and statisti-
cally validated networks which are most similar to the real data we have
from the E-MID, that is, Q = 2 and w = 1. We also set the time window of
investigation to one three-maintenance period, in such a way that our real
database is divided in 44 subsets, of roughly three months each. We use our
model in the following way. Suppose our objective is to compare the net-
works observed in real data in a given time window, e.g., the fifth one, from
24-Dec-1999 to 23-Mar-2000. We imagine to have access to precise informa-
tion about the individual bank overall-liquidity needs in this period, and,
accordingly, we set the quantities Bl.lai , B
b,la
i , B
l,ba
i , and B
b,ba
i (i = 1, ..., n) in
the fifth time window from real data. Furthermore, we use the real networks
observed in the previous two time windows (Q=2), the third and the fourth
one, to construct the memory terms NBj→Bi , (i, j = 1, ..., n), with i 6= j,
that is used in our model. Then we obtain a realization of our model for
the the fifth three-maintenance period, that we shall compare with the real
network observed at the E-MID. We repeat the analysis for all the three-
maintenance periods in the dataset starting from the third one, due to the
memory requirement of our model. We perform the comparison separately
for lender-aggressor and borrower-aggressor transaction, and for the original
and statistically validated networks. The comparison could be performed
according to two standard measures of performance of a classification test,
specificity and sensitivity. Let’s consider a real weighted network R, where
a weight wRi,j is the number of transactions that occurred from bank i (the
lender) to j (the borrower) in a given time window, and the corresponding
network obtained with our model, S, with weights wSi,j that indicate the num-
ber of predicted transactions from i to j. We indicate the total number of
transactions that occur in R (S) with ER =
∑n
i,j=1w
R
i,j (ES =
∑n
i,j=1w
S
i,j).
Finally, we indicate the number of transactions that occur in both R and S
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with ER,S =
∑n
i,j=1Min(w
R
i,j, w
S
i,j). Using this notation we have that
Sensitivity =
TP
TP + FN
=
ER,S
ER,S + (ER − ER,S) =
ER,S
ER
; (12)
Specificity =
TN
TN + FP
=
U − ER − ES + ER,S
[U − ER − ES + ER,S] + (ES − ER,S) =
=
U − ER − ES + ER,S
U − ER , (13)
where TP, TN, FP, and FN are the number of true positive, true negative,
false positive, and false negative detections of real transactions in model
simulations respectively and U is the total number of all the potential trans-
actions among banks that can occur in a given time window. Such a number
of transactions does not have a natural upper bound, which indicates that
specificity of model predictions here tends to 1, in spite of the model used to
anticipate empirical observations. So, we decided to disregard specificity in
the reminder of this section, and to include another measure of performance
of model predictions. Specifically, we considered the weighted Jaccard index
between real and simulated networks. Using the notation introduced above,
the weighted Jaccard index reads:
WJI =
TP
TP + FP + FN
=
ER,S
ER + ES − ER,S . (14)
This equation shows that the only difference between WJI and sensitivity is
the denominator, which is larger in the WJI index than in the sensitivity,
unless the model provides exact predictions. Conceptually, the advantage of
including the WJI in the present analysis, besides sensitivity, is that it also
includes information about the number of False positives to assess the level
of performance of a given model. In this section, we shall investigate the
improvement of performance that the memory term in our model introduces
with respect to the case in which we just assume to have precise information
about each individual bank overall-liquidity needs in a three-maintenance
period. Therefore we also report results obtained by neglecting the memory
term in our model, which is equivalent to assume a random pairing of banks
in a time window, weighted according their specific liquidity needs.
Table 2 reports the average values of sensitivity and WJI associated with
the different sets (borrower and lender aggressor), models (memory Q=2 and
no-memory), and networks (original and Bonferroni networks). Averages
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Table 2: Performance of model prediction. L-A indicates lender-aggressor transactions.
B-A indicates borrower-aggressor transactions.
Original network Bonferroni network
Data type <Sensitivity> (SEM) <WJI> (SEM) <Sensitivity> (SEM) <WJI> (SEM)
L-A (Q=2) 0.67(0.004) 0.51(0.005) 0.39(0.011) 0.26(0.008)
L-A (no memory) 0.55(0.004) 0.38(0.004) 0(0) 0(0)
B-A (Q=2) 0.61(0.004) 0.44(0.004) 0.37(0.015) 0.27(0.012)
B-A (no memory) 0.48(0.006) 0.31(0.004) 0(0) 0(0)
are calculated over 42 three-maintenance periods, from the 3rd to the 44th,
and the standard error of the mean (SEM) is reported in parentheses. The
results reported in the table indicate that our model clearly outperforms the
model with no memory, which is solely based on the (exact) prediction of
liquidity needs of each bank. The result that sensitivity and WJI of the no-
memory model in the Bonferroni network are both equal to 0 is due to the
fact that the Bonferroni network associated with this model is empty, that
is, no preferential pattern is anticipated by this model.
4.3.4. Bidirectional links
Our model does not involve any mechanism of reciprocity. Indeed the
memory term NA→B(t) only counts the number of times in which bank A lent
to bank B in the past, and, therefore, does not include information about the
number of times in which A borrowed money from B in the past. This lack
of reciprocity implies that a bidirectional link, either statistically validated
or not, may appear in an outcome of the model only by chance. To check if
our hypothesis of no reciprocity is consistent with real data, we compared the
number of bidirectional links, in the original and Bonferroni network. Table
3 shows that the average number of bidirectional links observed in real data
is rather small, in both the original and Bonferroni network. Specifically
the fraction of bidirectional links is always smaller than 8% in real data.
Such a small value justifies neglecting reciprocity in the basic setting of our
model. However, according to Table 3 the percentage of bidirectional links
in empirical data is always larger than the percentage of bidirectional links
obtained from simulations, with parameter w = 1 and Q = 2, in both lender-
aggressor and borrower-aggressor datasets. Such results suggest that it may
be worth considering the possibility of introducing a reciprocity mechanism
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Table 3: Bidirectional links in real data and simulations with w = 1 and Q=2
Original network Bonferroni network
Data type Mean Std. Perc. Mean Std. Perc.
Lender aggr. (data) 210.8 111.9 7.6% 1.64 1.59 1.7%
Lender aggr. (sim.) 223.4 83.6 6.8% 0.02 0.15 0.02%
Borrower aggr. (data) 91.1 67.2 4.7% 0.45 0.85 1.2%
Borrower aggr. (sim.) 92.0 57.8 4.0% 0.02 0.15 0.04%
as a refinement of our model. This could be done by weighting the memory
term NA→B(t) with NB→A(t):
NλA↔B(t) = λNA→B(t) + (1− λ)NB→A(t),
where λ is a parameter ranging between 0 and 1. The quantity NλA↔B(t)
can be used in place of NA→B(t) in all the equations of the model in order
to introduce a degree of reciprocity, which is controlled by parameter λ.
Intuitively, the value of λ should be quite close to 1, in order to replicate
the (rather small) average number of bidirectional validated links observed
in real data.
.
4.3.5. 3-motifs
So far we have investigated the capability of the model in reproducing
the number of links between pairs of banks. In fact, one can also investigate
the behavior over time of higher order network structures. Specifically, we
will consider isomorphic 3-motifs, i.e. network structures formed by triplets
of nodes, see (Milo et al. (2002)). In Fig. 9 we show the 13 different types
of isomorphic 3-motifs. There are different ways to label 3-motifs. In the
present paper we use the labeling of FANMOD program, see (Wernicke et
al. (2006)). FANMOD algorithm is one of the most widespread algorithm
for detection and analysis of isomorphic motifs. Specifically, it detects 3-
motifs (and also motifs with a larger number of nodes) and compares their
percentage with the ones obtained with different null hypotheses by repeating
the analysis on rewired versions of the investigated network. The program
allows three different rewiring procedures. The one we have selected for the
present investigation is the one setting constant the value of in-degree and
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Figure 9: The 13 isomorphic directed 3-motifs. The numeric code is the one used by the
FANMOD program.
out-degree of each note without any other additional constraint (this option
is called NR in the FANMOD package). A p-value is directly associated
with a motif by the tool FANMOD, by comparing the frequency of the given
motif in the network with its frequency in a number of networks (we have
set this number to 1,000) obtained by randomly rewiring the original one.
There are different options for the rewiring. In the present analysis, we have
chosen the rewiring done by keeping constant the in-degree and out-degree of
each bank. From the p-value one can determine if a motif is over-expressed,
under-expressed, or normally expressed.
We have compared the original and statistically validated networks from
real data and from simulations according to the fraction of 13 different types
of 3-motifs that can be present in a network. Figure 10 shows the number
of three-maintenance periods in which each 3-motif type turns out to be
over-expressed, under-expressed, normally expressed, and not present in the
original networks obtained from real data of lender-aggressor (left panels)
and from lender-aggressor transactions generated by our model with w = 1
and Q = 2. Figure 10 shows that the number of three-maintenance periods
in which each motif is normally expressed in the original network obtained
from simulations is larger than the corresponding number obtained from
real data. Interestingly motif 140, which represents circular transactions is
under-expressed in real network indicating that liquidity does not normally
flow from one bank to the other and back to the first. In fact most of the
motifs described by closed triangles (motifs 38 and 46 are an exception) are
under-expressed suggesting that (on aggregate) banks tend to act as either
lender or borrower in the system and do not actively engage in transactions
on both side of the market.
Similar results are observed in Fig. 11 where the same investigation is
repeated for the networks obtained from borrower -aggressor transactions.
Interestingly, the main difference between Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 concerns
motifs 36 that is under-expressed in the lender-aggressor network and nor-
mally expressed in borrower-aggressor network. This 3-motif describes credit
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provided to one bank from two banks. The 3-motifs analysis shows that
such relationships can be different when the transactions are originated by
borrower-aggressors or lender-aggressors.
We have also performed the analysis on the statistically validated net-
works. Also in this case we detect some over-expressed 3-motif. However the
comparison with simulated data is problematic for validated networks be-
cause the number of 3-motifs is limited and many 3-motifs are not detected
at all. Therefore we do not provide here a comparison between real data and
simulated data for statistically validated networks.
Figure 10: Number of three-maintenance periods (out of 44) in which each three-motif type
(indicated in the horizontal axis) is over-expressed, under-expressed, normally expressed,
and not present in the original (left panel) networks associated with real data of lender-
aggressor and with corresponding lender-aggressor transactions from simulations of the
model with w = 1 and Q = 2 (top left). Over-expressions and under expressions are
obtained by performing a multiple hypothesis test correction. The over/under expression
of a three motif indicates that the corresponding p-value provided by FANMOD was
smaller than 0.01/(13 · 44), where 13 is the number of three-motif types and 44 is the
number of three-maintenance periods investigated.
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Figure 11: Number of three-maintenance periods (out of 44) in which each three-motif type
(indicated in the horizontal axis) is over-expressed, under-expressed, normally expressed,
and not present in the original (left panel) networks associated with real data of lender-
aggressor and with corresponding borrower-aggressor transactions from simulations of the
model with w = 1 and Q = 2 (top left). Over-expressions and under expressions are
obtained by performing a multiple hypothesis test correction. The over/under expression
of a three motif indicates that the corresponding p-value provided by FANMOD was
smaller than 0.01/(13 · 44), where 13 is the number of three-motif types and 44 is the
number of three-maintenance periods investigated.
5. Conclusions
We have introduced a simple model with memory to describe the for-
mation of a networked structure of an interbank market. Such a structure
presents preferential patterns of trading between banks incompatible with the
null hypothesis of random pairing of banks. The null hypothesis takes into
account the heterogeneity of banks, and so does the model. Within a time
interval of the model, the memory mechanism assumes that the probability
that a lender and a borrower end up trading at a given time step depends
on their trading frequency (their heterogeneity) times the sum of two terms.
The first one is the number of times in which the borrower borrowed from
the lender in the past, and the other term, w, represents an overall attrac-
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tiveness of borrowers. High values of parameter w, e.g. w > 10, disfavor the
appearance of preferential patterns of trading. On the contrary, low values
of parameter, e.g. w < 0.1, favor the formation of many preferential pat-
terns of trading. If the number of transactions per bank remains constant
over time then such preferential patterns will remain essentially the same,
and the market will tend to freeze in a network in which most of the trans-
actions occur between banks that have heavily traded in the past. On the
other hand, if the number of transactions per bank in a given time period is
obtained as in mode I, that is, by independently sampling from a Lognormal
distribution, then preferential patterns will change over time. So, low values
of w allow to model a status of the market in which “trust” (and “distrust”)
dominates the process of bank pairing. A high degree of agreement between
model and real data of the e-MID market, in terms of number of preferential
links observed over time, is attained by setting w ≈ 1.
The parameter Q allows one to set the level of memory of banks. Four
values of Q have been considered, Q = 1, 2, 4 and 8 time periods.The com-
parison between model outcomes obtained with these values of Q indicates
that the model is not significantly affected by this parameter, in terms of the
number of observed preferential connections.
The best agreement with e-MID data was achieved for values of w = 1
and Q = 2. Model outcomes and real data have also been compared in
terms of number of bidirectional links observed in the original and Bonfer-
roni networks. The presence of bidirectional links is small (< 10%) in both
real data and simulations, indicating a low degree of reciprocity in the sys-
tem. However, on average, model outcomes present a smaller percentage of
bidirectional links than real data. A simple method to introduce a tunable
level of reciprocity has been proposed, but not investigated, in consideration
of the low number of bidirectional links observed in real data. Finally, we
have compared real data and simulations in terms of the presence of 3-motifs
in the original networks. Our results suggest that the observed frequency
of 3-motifs in the networks associated with model realizations is, on aver-
age, more similar to the one expected in a random network than to the one
observed in real data. This result suggests that the moderate presence of
over-expression and under-expression of triadic structures in real data is not
captured by our model of random pairing with memory. However, the param-
eter Q influences the degree of persistence of preferential patterns of trading
activity across different time periods. The model proposed can be extended
in a number of dimensions. Besides incorporating, as already discussed, a
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reciprocity mechanism and a time and node dependent parameter w (thus
changing its role from a randomization parameter to a fitness parameter) we
could also allow for preferential trading within small groups of banks. This
would allow to take into account the existence of banking groups, but also
of trust propagation effects: at times of greater uncertain, banks may prefer
to trade with banks that are trusted counter parties of their own trusted
counter parties.
Furthermore it would be interesting to introduce uncertainty in the model
by assuming a random arrival of liquidity shocks. In this way we could over-
come the problem of non-causality occurring when the number of transaction
in an estimating period is too large to realistically assume that a bank can
foresee all of them . In Appendix A we have sketched how to generalize our
model to this setting. Finally the model could be extended by allowing banks
to trade strategically in anticipation of their future liquidity needs and not
only respond to their immediate ones.
Appendix A. Extension of the model
The objective of our model is mainly to show how an intuitive mecha-
nism, such as a memory mechanism, which determines the probability that
two banks trade at a given time, may give rise to preferential patterns of
trading that have been observed in real data (see Hatzopoulos et al 2013). If
the memory term is neglected in the model equations, then no statistically
validated links are generated (see subsection 4.3.3), in spite of the way in
which bank-liquidity needs are modeled. In the model, we assume to know
in advance bank liquidity needs in a given time window, specifically, the
exact number of lender aggressor and borrower aggressor transactions that
each bank will do in the next time window. Such an assumption is a strong
one, particularly if the time window is long. In principle, it could be relaxed
and allow the information about the number of trades to be executed to be
revealed over time. Specifically, Eq. 3 and 8 of the paper could have been
replaced by
p(Bj → Bi, t) = pb,lai (t) · pl,laj (t) ·
w +NBj→Bi(t)∑n
q=1w +NBq→Bi(t)
, (A.1)
p(Bj → Bi, t) = pl,baj (t) · pb,bai (t) ·
w +NBj→Bi(t)∑n
m=1w +NBj→Bm(t)
, (A.2)
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respectively, where pb,lai (t) is the probability that bank i acts as a borrower
in a lender aggressor transaction after t transactions occurred, pl,laj (t) is the
probability that bank j acts as a lender in a lender aggressor transaction
after t transactions occurred, pb,bai (t) is the probability that bank i acts as a
borrower in a borrower aggressor transaction after t transactions occurred,
and pl,baj (t) is the probability that bank i acts as a lender in a borrower
aggressor transaction after t transactions occurred. These probabilities only
include information about the instantaneous liquidity needs of banks, and
the causality concern would have been fully addressed. Furthermore, using
these equations would also have the advantage of removing the dependency
of the model from the time window TM . However, in this case, it would have
been necessary to introduce a model to account for the co-evolution of the
4× n probabilities above, in order to run any simulation, and a multivariate
model of bank-liquidity needs was out of the scope of the present paper.
Furthermore, it would also have been very difficult to fit such probabilities
to E-MID transaction data, in order to calibrate the model. It is to note
that if the probabilities above are assumed to be approximately constant
over a time window Tm, then quantities reported in Eq. 3 and 8 of the paper
represent proxies of the four probabilities reported above:
pb,lai (t) ≈ B
b,la
i (t)∑n
k=1B
b,la
k (t)
; pl,laj (t) ≈
Bl,laj (t)∑n
k=1B
l,la
k (t)
;
pb,bai (t) ≈ B
b,ba
i (t)∑n
k=1B
b,ba
k (t)
; pl,baj (t) ≈
Bl,baj (t)∑n
k=1B
l,ba
k (t)
;
So, the model presented in the paper aims at untangling a model of bank-
liquidity needs and a model of trading between banks, which is the one we
focus in our paper. However, we envision for the future the possibility to
model bank-liquidity needs and to present a more comprehensive model that
incorporates both these aspects of an inter-bank market.
Appendix B. Details about Java Implementation
A version of the model has been developed using Java and the MASON
library for multi-agent modeling (Luke et al. (2005)). The implementation
within the Java/Mason framework will allow to include and integrate our
model into the interbank sector of the CRISIS macro-financial software li-
brary and in this appendix we briefly outline the structure of our Java/Mason
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software. Besides the Model and Scheduler MASON classes, our model de-
fines three new classes: Transaction, Bank and Market. The class Trans-
action basically represents a credit line between a Bank which acts as a
lender and a Bank which acts as a borrower. The class Bank has data mem-
bers to hold the number of transactions each bank wants to do as borrower
and as lender (two variables for the lender-aggressor scheme and two for the
borrower-aggressor one) and four ArrayLists to store the Transaction objects
describing the bank’s credit lines with all the other banks. It also contains
methods to call when a new Transaction occurs: they will update the cumu-
lative and marginal transactions between the two agents and correspondingly
decrease the number of the transaction they can still perform until the end
of the simulated three-maintenance period. The class Market is an abstract
class and is currently extended by two child classes: LA Market for the
lender-aggressor setting and BA Market for the case of borrower-aggressors.
While these two classes implement methods to choose the aggressor agent
of the transaction and its counterpart following equations 1 and 2 (or equa-
tions 5 and 7 for the borrower-aggressor scheme), the parent abstract class
defines a method to perform a single transaction, which automatically picks
up a couple of agents with the correct probability and updates all of their
data members (cumulative and marginal transactions, and transactions to
be performed).
Appendix C. Statistically validated networks
We perform a statistical test by comparing the empirically observed num-
ber of transactions between each pair of banks against a random null hy-
pothesis taking into account the trading heterogeneity of the system. As
discussed in Hatzopoulos et al. (2013), we estimate a p-value for the empir-
ically detected values in terms of a probabilistic description based on the
hypergeometric distribution. The probabilistic description provides analyti-
cal results that are only approximated because the probabilistic description
does not avoid the possibility that a bank can lend money to itself.
Hereafter, for the sake of completeness, we briefly outline the used ap-
proach. For each link in the network, we perform a statistical test to check
whether two banks preferentially traded in a given time interval. Our test
is done by using a recently proposed method (Li et al. (2014)) that is a di-
rectional variant of the method presented in Tumminello et al. (2011). The
statistical test is implemented as follows. For each time interval, we define
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NT as the total number of trades among banks in the system and focus on
two banks i and j to check whether i preferentially lent money to j. Let us
call nil the number of times bank i lent money to any other bank, and n
j
b the
number of times bank j borrowed money from any other bank. Assuming
that nijlb is the number of times bank i lent money to j then the probability
of observing such nijlb trades, assuming that j and i select counter-parties
randomly, is given by the hypergeometric distribution
H(nijlb |NT , nil, njb) =
( nil
nijlb
) (NT−nil
njb−nijlb
)
(NT
njb
) . (C.1)
We use this probability to associate a p-value with the observed number nijlb
of trades from bank i to bank j as p(nijlb) =
∑min[nil,njb]
X=nijlb
H(X|NT , nil, njb), that
is the probability of observing by chance a number of trades from i to j equal
to nijlb or larger. This p-value is calculated by taking the sum of probabilities
over the right tail of the hypergeometric distribution. Therefore the p-value
can be used to disprove or verify the null hypothesis of random selection of
a counter-party
The hypergeometric distribution can be used to describe variable nijlb be-
cause the problem can be mapped into an urn model (Feller (1968), Hat-
zopoulos et al. (2013)). Note that mapping the problem of randomizing
bank loans onto an urn model is done at the cost of removing the constraint
that a bank cannot lend money to itself. This means that our analytical so-
lution for the random system is an approximation of what we would obtain
by randomly rewiring data and enforcing the condition of no self loans.
To avoid a large number of false positive validated links, due to the large
number of statistical tests, it is advisable to consider a method to control the
family-wise error rate. This control can be done by applying the so-called
Bonferroni correction. This correction requires that the univariate level of
statistical significance, e.g. pu = 0.01, is corrected in presence of multiple
tests. In the present study, we set the Bonferroni correction as discussed in
Hatzopoulos et al. (2013).
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